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Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such
fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It
was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments,
accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which
they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation
and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable
negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant.
Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information.
Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs, which is consistent with a motivated information-
processing model of negotiation.
In a world where conflict abounds, people must frequently
negotiate with others to get what they want, to get along, or even
simply to get by. Indeed, successful negotiation is associated with
a large number of positive consequences for both the individual
and the community at large, including increased relationship sat-
isfaction, long-term stability of interpersonal relationships, peace-
ful relations between groups, and economic prosperity (Rubin,
Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). It therefore comes as no surprise that social
scientists have a long-standing fascination with the study of how
people use negotiation to resolve their divergent interests and
arrive at a mutual understanding (Pruitt, 1998).
As noted by many negotiation experts (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Lax
& Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982), successful negotiation is not only
highly desirable but also difficult to achieve. The difficulty of
negotiation is illustrated by the ubiquitous occurrence of conflict
escalation, ranging from large-scale international conflicts
(Baumeister, 1997; Brown & Rosecrance, 1999; Cranna, 1994), to
small-scale—but no less tragic—cases of domestic violence like
wife battering and child abuse (see, e.g., Baumeister, Smart, &
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Boden, 1996; Tjosvold, Tjosvold, & Tjosvold, 1991). Corroborat-
ing everyday observations, negotiation researchers have found that
negotiators frequently reach outcomes that are suboptimal by
normative standards (Raiffa, 1982). Researchers have pointed to
negotiators' inclination to base their judgments and behaviors on
faulty beliefs and inappropriate sources of information as a major
underlying cause of the apparent difficulties that people experience
in negotiation (see, e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1991). For example,
negotiators have been found to rely on the representational format
of the negotiation outcomes (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; De Dreu &
McCusker, 1997), stereotypic information about other parties (De
Dreu, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1995), and momentarily accessible
anchor values (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Northcraft &
Neale, 1987).
Among the various cognitive barriers to successful negotiation,
one stands out as being especially self-defeating and hence partic-
ularly worrisome. Specifically, there exists a tendency among
negotiators to view own priorities and those of the other party as
diametrically opposed (Schelling, 1960). Such a fixed-pie bias
(Bazerman & Neale, 1983) and associated fixed-pie perceptions
(L. L. Thompson & Hastie, 1990) imply an egocentric disregard of
the other party, in that other's preferences are seen as the mere
mirror image of one's own preferences. Consequently, reliance on
fixed-pie perceptions may cause people to overlook the benefits
that are associated with own-other differences in priorities. For
example, a potential car buyer may be very concerned about the
price of a new car but be indifferent about the delivery time. To the
salesperson, however, the delivery time may be very important and
getting the advertised price on the car may be a lesser concern.
Accordingly, different patterns of priorities yield integrative po-
tential, situations in which opposing negotiators can both attain
high outcomes. Unfortunately, when such integrative potential
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goes unrecognized, the negotiators generally reach a suboptimal
agreement. Consistent with this, research has linked reliance on
fixed-pie perceptions to suboptimal negotiation outcomes (L. L.
Thompson, 1991; L. L. Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
In spite of their apparently self-defeating consequences, fixed-
pie perceptions appear to be commonly held among negotiators
and seem quite resistant to change. Indeed, many negotiators hold
on to their faulty fixed-pie perceptions even after extensive face-
to-face contact with the other party (L. L. Thompson & Hastie,
1990). The persistence of fixed-pie perceptions, in conjunction
with their potential destructiveness, constitutes an important ratio-
nale for investigating factors that may assist in the appropriate
revision of fixed-pie perceptions. In the present research, we
considered whether accuracy motivation would induce negotiators
to pay more attention to the other party's preferences and thus
release their invalid fixed-pie perceptions. As an outline of the
things to come, we begin by discussing past research on fixed-pie
perceptions in negotiation in some greater detail. After this, we
turn to more recent research on motivational influences on the use
of cognitive heuristics and discuss the relevance of the distinction
between social motivation (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995) and
nondirectional motives, such as accuracy motivation. Finally, we
present two experiments that were designed to test our theoretical
analysis.
Fixed-Pie Perceptions in Negotiation
At a general level, studying negotiators' insight into the prefer-
ences of the other party can be related to the broader issue of
accuracy in person perception. Social psychology has had a long-
standing interest in studying the factors that determine the accu-
racy of people's perceptions of others (see, e.g., Funder, 1987,
1995; Gilbert, 1998; Hastie & Rasinski, 1988; Kruglanski, 1989).
Much of the social psychological debate on the accuracy of person
perception has centered around the question of how accuracy
should be defined and operationalized (see, e.g., Funder, 1987,
1995; Hastie & Rasinski, 1988). Although this debate has some
important philosophical implications (see, e.g., Kruglanski, 1989),
the operationalization of accuracy appears less problematic in the
context of negotiation research, where the other's payoff structure
can be objectively determined (and even manipulated) in a rela-
tively straightforward manner (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). As such,
negotiation paradigms offer a pragmatic solution to the study
of psychological issues surrounding the accuracy of social
perception.
Early investigations of fixed-pie perceptions were conducted by
Pruitt and Carnevale (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kimmel,
Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; O'Connor,
1997; O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997) who assessed the negotiators'
perceptions of other's pay-offs immediately after the negotiation.
Other research has developed more sophisticated measures of
fixed-pie perceptions and also assessed fixed-pie perceptions both
before and after the negotiation (see, e.g., L. L. Thompson &
Hastie, 1990). Typically, this research has provided negotiators
before interaction with their potential pay-offs on a number of
issues, and these potential pay-offs have been manipulated in such
a way that a party's gains on a particular issue do not equal the
opposing party's losses on that issue. However, individual nego-
tiators have not been shown the opposing parties' pay-offs on a
particular issue. At the outset (and sometimes at the end) of the
negotiation, participants are asked to estimate the other's pay-offs
on each of the issues under negotiation. The more these estimates
are diametrically opposed to the negotiator's own pay-offs, the
more he or she is assumed to have a fixed-pie perception. The
more these estimates match the opponent's true pay-offs, the more
accurately negotiators perceive integrative potential (Pruitt &
Carnevale, 1993; L. L. Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
Research using this task has documented that, as mentioned, a
substantial majority of individuals enter the negotiation with a
fixed-pie perception (see, e.g., Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft,
1995; L. L. Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Given that, in this para-
digm, negotiators did not possess a priori information about the
other party's preferences, one may argue that finding fixed-pie
perceptions in the early stages of the negotiation is somewhat of an
artifact. After all, these negotiators do not have anything else to go
on besides their own pay-off schedule to estimate other's prefer-
ences at the outset of the negotiation. Pruitt and Carnevale (1993,
pp. 86-87) suggested that labeling the task negotiation encourages
the fixed-pie assumption because the usual stereotype of negotia-
tion is of a heavily contentious interchange, whereas the reality
often involves subtle problem solving. Some indirect evidence for
this explanation comes from a study by Neale and Northcraft
(1986) that showed that sophisticated negotiators (experts) are less
affected by fixed-pie perceptions than naive negotiators such as
students in laboratory experiments. Alternatively, this finding may
reflect a genuine psychological phenomenon, which consists of
projecting one's self-attributes onto the other when information
about the other is vague or ambiguous (Harinck, De Dreu & Van
Vianen, 2000; Krueger, 1998). In any case, given the near-
universal prevalence of fixed-pie perceptions at the outset of the
negotiation, negotiation success would seem to depend predomi-
nantly on the extent to which negotiators revise their unfounded
fixed-pie perceptions. Unfortunately, research indicates that in
many cases, fixed-pie perceptions are maintained throughout the
negotiation, leaving much integrative potential unexploited
(Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).
Given that normal (i.e., nonclinical) people generally do not
engage in self-destructive behavior on purpose (Baumeister &
Scher, 1988), it appears that some psychological obstacles may
conspire against the appropriate revision of fixed-pie perceptions
in negotiation. One such obstacle may lie in the negotiator's
limited information-processing capacity (Neale & Bazerman,
1991). The negotiator's task is particularly complex and ambigu-
ous. Successful negotiators must have attained at least some un-
derstanding of their own interests, must keep those interests in
mind during the negotiation, and must get them across to the other
party. At the same time, they must pay attention to what the other
is saying, doing, and otherwise communicating; must keep these
things in mind as well; and must try to figure out what they mean
in terms of the other's underlying interests. On the basis of this
understanding, negotiators must then work out some kind of a
solution that is likely to lead to an agreement. Although this only
scratches the surface of the actual information processing that goes
on in even the simplest of negotiations, it should be clear that the
sheer complexity of the negotiation task is overwhelming. Accord-
ingly, negotiators may cling to fixed-pie perceptions because they
simplify the negotiation situation, even when they are faulty.
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Motivation in Negotiation
Although the limited-capacity account is theoretically plausible,
it cannot offer a complete explanation for inappropriate persistence
of fixed-pie perceptions. In particular, several experiments have
shown that encouraging negotiators to exchange information about
their preferences leads to decreased fixed-pie perceptions and to
higher joint outcomes (Kemp & Smith, 1994; L. L. Thompson,
1991). Such findings are difficult to understand if one assumes that
negotiators rely on fixed-pie perceptions because they would oth-
erwise be overloaded with information. If this were correct, ex-
hortations to engage in information exchange would only risk an
additional increase in information overload, especially if one con-
siders that information implying differences between own and
other's preferences is unexpected and that paying attention to
unexpected information usurps cognitive resources (Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999). Accordingly, this
research suggests that much of the persistence in fixed-pie percep-
tions stems from negotiators' reluctance to exchange information
regarding their preferences, as well as from their reluctance to
process the information that becomes available during negotiation.
Whether negotiators exchange information about preferences
and priorities is strongly contingent on their social motivation to
search for good outcomes for themselves (an egoistic motivation)
or to search for good outcomes for themselves and their opponent
(a prosocial motivation). A prosocial rather than individualistic
motivation produces trust and stimulates the exchange of informa-
tion about preferences and priorities (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon,
2000; Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).
Accordingly, Pruitt (1990) argued that an individualistic motiva-
tion leads to a win-lose attitude with concomitant fixed-pie per-
ceptions. When negotiators have a prosocial motivation, they are
less likely to adopt a win-lose attitude and more likely to exchange
information, to subsequently revise their fixed-pie perceptions,
and, consequently, to reach more integrative agreements. Although
this reasoning seems plausible, Pruitt's analysis has thus far re-
ceived only weak support in empirical studies. Carnevale and Isen
(1986) observed fewer fixed-pie perceptions when negotiators had
a prosocial rather than an individualistic motivation. Gelfand and
Christakopoulou (1999) found that negotiators with individualistic
values (U.S. citizens) were less likely to exchange information and
to change their fixed-pie perceptions than negotiators with proso-
cial, collectivist values (Greek citizens). However, O'Connor
(1997), O'Connor and Carnevale (1997), and Kimmel et al. (1980)
failed to find effects of social motivation on fixed-pie perceptions.
The mixed evidence for Pruitt's argument suggests that the
revision of fixed-pie perceptions may depend not only on the
exchange of information, which is contingent upon negotiators'
social motivation, but also on the extent to which negotiators
process this information. The extent to which people process
information depends on their nondirectional motivation—that is,
their motivation to form an accurate and reasonable impression,
rather than one predisposed toward any particular conclusion.1
Nondirectional motivation is central to so-called dual-process
models (for discussions, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kruglanski
& Thompson, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, in press). These models
share the assumption that individuals can choose from two alter-
native strategies for processing information. The first strategy is to
solve logical problems, to evaluate persuasive arguments, or to
form impressions of others through a quick, effortless, and heu-
ristic processing of information that rests on well-learned prior
associations. Alternatively, individuals may engage in more effort-
ful, deliberate, and systematic processing that involves rule-based
inferences (Brewer, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Kruglanski & Webster,
1996; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Individuals are more likely to engage in the systematic process-
ing of information when their nondirectional motivation is high
rather than low. Attitude research has shown that people engage in
more effortful, systematic screening of the persuasive message
when they feel a strong need to be accurate. This need to be
accurate is higher when the topic is personally involving, when
personal consequences are important, or when one is held account-
able for one's judgments and decisions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Petty & Cacciopo, 1986). Person perception research has shown
that people are less likely to base their judgments and decisions on
prior-held stereotypes and instead develop a more accurate and
individuated impression when the target of judgment is motiva-
tionally relevant (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). For
instance, people engage in more effortful, systematic processing of
person information when they depend on the target of judgment
(see, e.g., Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Finally, individual decision-
making research has shown that people engage in more systematic,
thorough processing of information when the process or outcomes
of those decisions are subject to potential criticism. When decision
makers are held accountable by others, they feel an urge to
preempt potential criticism and engage in thorough, systematic
processing of information (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock,
1992).
In recent years, notions from dual-process models have been
shown to generalize to situations involving social interaction in
general and negotiation in particular (De Dreu et al., 1999; De
Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; L. L. Thompson,
1995). Of specific interest to the current research is a recent study
by L. L. Thompson (1995). In this study, participants observed
videotaped negotiations between two individuals, one representing
the participant's position and the other representing the opposing
position. The participant's task was to provide estimates of the
opposing negotiator's preferences and priorities. When partici-
pants were held accountable for their judgmental process, their
judgments were rather accurate. When participants were not held
accountable, their judgments tended to reflect fixed-pie percep-
tions. Unfortunately, this study by L. L. Thompson did not involve
actual negotiation between participants. Thus, it remains to be seen
whether results generalize to actual negotiation where participants
interact in a complex, ambiguous, and noisy situation. In addition,
because participants in her study did not negotiate, the conse-
quences for revisions in fixed-pie perceptions for joint outcomes
from the negotiation could not be assessed.
1
 Nondirectional motivation resembles accuracy motivation (Chaiken &
Trope, 1999), need for cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and need for
cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Although specific differ-
ences between these concepts may exist, they are assumed in the cunent
research to be functionally equivalent and can be used interchangeably.
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Overview of the Present Research
Individuals tend to enter the negotiation with fixed-pie percep-
tions, and when they do not change these perceptions during
negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. Past research
provides some support for the idea that social motivation leads
negotiators to revise their fixed-pie perceptions. We suspected that
information exchange, which is contingent on social motivation,
might not be sufficient to counter fixed-pie perceptions. On the
basis of dual-process models, we argued that nondirectional mo-
tivation to engage in systematic processing of information is
needed for fixed-pie perceptions to be revised during negotiation.2
It could be that through more careful processing of information,
negotiators might be able to go beyond their fixed-pie perceptions
to develop a more accurate understanding of the opposing nego-
tiator's preferences and priorities and to reach more mutually
beneficial, integrative agreements.
To test this general hypothesis, we conducted two experiments.
In both experiments, we measured fixed-pie perceptions prior to
and at the end of negotiation, allowing us to detect any changes in
negotiator perceptions during negotiation. In both experiments, we
established differences in the negotiator's nondirectional motiva-
tion by manipulating process accountability (Simonson & Staw,
1992). Under process accountability, individuals expect to be
observed and evaluated by others with unknown views about the
process of judgment and decision making (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999; Tetlock, 1992). Simonson and Staw (1992) argued that
individuals under process accountability tend to engage in preemp-
tive self-criticism, leading to more evenhanded evaluation of de-
cision alternatives and reduced need for self-justification. Al-
though process accountability has, as far as we know, not been
studied in face-to-face negotiation, individual decision-making
research suggests that
accountability attenuated bias on tasks to the extent that (a) subopti-
mal performance resulted from lack of self-critical attention to the
judgmental process and (b) improvement required no special training
in formal decision rules, only greater attention to the information
provided. (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 263)
Experiment 1 was designed to test the basic notion that negotiators
under process accountability revise their fixed-pie perceptions to a
greater extent than negotiators not held accountable, allowing the
former to reach more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 was
designed to obtain a more fine-grained insight into the impact of
process accountability on information processing in negotiation.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted to test three specific hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that at the end of the negotiation, negoti-
ators under process accountability would have more accurate per-
ceptions (and fewer fixed-pie perceptions) than negotiators who
were not held accountable. Hypothesis 2 predicted that negotiators
under process accountability would achieve more integrative
agreements than negotiators not held accountable. Hypothesis 3,
finally, predicted that the greater number of integrative agree-
ments reached by negotiators under process accountability would
be due to the development of more accurate perceptions during
negotiation.
Method
Participants and experimental design. One hundred and two male and
female business students participated in the experiment for which they
received 15 Dutch guilders (approximately U.S. $8). Process accountability
(present vs. absent) was manipulated between dyads. The dependent vari-
ables were fixed-pie perceptions before and after the negotiation, informa-
tion exchange and competitive behavior during negotiation, joint out-
comes, and social motivation (i.e., whether negotiators adopted an egoistic
vs. prosocial goal). Competitive behavior, information exchange, and so-
cial motivation were included for exploratory reasons (see also under
Dependent measures, below).
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the one used by L. L.
Thompson and Hastie (1990). Same-sex participants came in even numbers
to the laboratory where they were randomly paired with each other (under
the restriction that they did not know one another). They received a written
information package containing negotiation materials (role instructions,
background information, profit sheets) and information intended to manip-
ulate process accountability. They were asked to read these materials
carefully, and any questions they had were answered as well as possible.
Only when the experimenters were convinced that all participants fully
understood the task were dyads taken to adjacent "negotiation offices."
Dyad members were seated in front of each other at a large table, separated
by a 10" X 150" wooden partition preventing participants from seeing each
other's profit schedules and notes. A microphone was attached to the table
for recording purposes. Participants were given a maximum of 20 min to
reach agreement. On agreement or when time ran out, participants filled
out a short questionnaire and were debriefed.
Manipulation of process accountability. Prior to the negotiation, par-
ticipants in the process accountability condition received a special memo.
The memo explained that within a few days after the study, interview
sessions would be conducted by an experienced negotiator and a psychol-
ogist interested in "the ways you negotiated, the decisions you made, the
procedures you followed, and why you pursued or dropped particular
strategies." Participants were asked to write down two times they were
available for such an interview and to authorize the use of tape recordings
from the negotiation for this particular interview (all participants com-
plied). Finally, participants in the process accountability condition received
a sheet of paper entitled "accountability interview" that they could use to
take notes on during negotiation that "they felt that might be useful during
the interview." Participants in the control condition did not receive the
special memo or any other information about the interview. They were
asked only to authorize the use of the tape recordings for scientific
purposes.
Negotiation task. The task was the same as the one employed by L. L.
Thompson and Hastie (1990) and concerned the purchase of a car. Buyer
and seller were required to reach agreement on interest, stereo equipment,
warrantee, and delivery. On each of these four issues, interests were
opposed. However, not all issues were equally important to a particular
negotiator, and issue priority differed between buyer and seller (i.e.,
interest was least important to the buyer and most important to the seller,
whereas the reverse held for warrantee; see Table 1). Thus, there was
integrative potential in that settlement on 10% interest, Type C stereo, 30
months warrantee, and 3 weeks delivery time yielded higher joint outcomes
(i.e., 8,000, with 4,000 to each individual negotiator) than an equal-split
compromise on all four issues (i.e., 5,600, with 2,800 to each negotiator).
Participants were motivated to take the negotiation seriously by being
told that points they obtained from the negotiation would be converted into
2
 A study by De Dreu et al. (1999) revealed that social motivation (i.e.,
social value orientation) was unrelated to nondirectional motivation (i.e.,
need for cognitive closure), suggesting that prosocial or individualistic
negotiators did not necessarily differ in the extent to which they engage in
systematic and thorough processing of information.
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Table 1
Profit Schedules for Buyer and Seller
Interest Stereo Warrantee Delivery
Buyer's profit schedule
10% (0) Type A (-2,400)
8% (400) Type B (-1,800)
6% (800) Type C (-1,200)
4% (1,200) Type D (-600)
2% (1,600) Type E (0)
6 months (0) 5 weeks (0)
12 months (1,000) 4 weeks (600)
18 months (2,000) 3 weeks (1,200)
24 months (3,000) 2 weeks (1,800)
30 months (4,000) 1 week (2,400)
Seller's profit schedule
10% (4,000) Type A (0)
8% (3,000) Type B (-600)
6% (2,000) Type C (-1,200)
4% (1,000) Type D (-1,800)
2% (0) Type E (-2,400)
6 months (1,600) 5 weeks (2,400)
12 months (1,200) 4 weeks (1,800)
18 months (800) 3 weeks (1,200)
24 months (400) 2 weeks (600)
30 months (0) 1 week (0)
Note. Buyer and seller saw only their own profit schedules and were not
permitted to exchange them. Numbers in parentheses are the point values
of a given option for the particular participant.
lottery tickets and that these lottery tickets would enter them in a draw for
a cash prize of 100 guilders (approximately U.S. $50). Thus, the more
points negotiators obtained, the more lottery tickets they would get and the
greater their chances would be of winning a cash prize. No indications were
given about the best strategy to obtain points.
Dependent measures. Fixed-pie perceptions were measured immedi-
ately before the negotiation interaction started and immediately after the
negotiation (but before participants were able to talk about their profit
schedules or exchange them). Fixed-pie perceptions were assessed as in
past research (e.g., L. L. Thompson & Hastie, 1990). At each measurement,
participants were presented with a profit schedule without the points
between brackets and were asked to fill in the points they thought their
opposing party would get for each of the contract levels specified. Partic-
ipants were permitted to use their own profit schedules to make inferences.
We calculated fixed-pie perceptions by subtracting the number of points
attributed to the opponent on the two integrative issues (interest and
warrantee) from the points in the participant's own profit schedule. For
example, on the interest issue (pay-off between 0 and 1,600 points; see
Table 1), if the buyer fills in that the seller gets between 1,600 and 0 points
in increments of 400, the difference between own and (presumed) other's
pay-off is 0 (i.e., [1,600 - 0] + [1,200 - 400] + [800 - 800] +
[400 - 1,200] + [0 - 1,600]). In other words, a score of zero would
indicate the participant has a fixed-pie perception. If, in contrast, the buyer
fills in that her seller gets between 4,000 and 0 points in increments
of 1,000 (thus correctly perceiving integrative potential), the absolute
difference between own and (presumed) other's pay-off is 6,000 (i.e.,
[1,600 - 0] + [1,200 - 1,000] + [800 - 2,000] + [400 - 3,000] +
[0 - 4,000]). Because there are two integrative issues, the total deviance
between self and other is 12,000 per negotiator when the negotiator
accurately perceives integrative potential and 0 in the case of (perfect)
fixed-pie perceptions. Three participants appeared to have made wild
guesses and had scores that deviated extremely from the mean. The scores
from these participants were replaced by a score that was two standard
deviations from the overall mean (excluding these participants did not
affect the results, however).
Information exchange and competitive behavior were assessed from the
tape recordings. These were transcribed, and, using well-established coding
schemes, speaker turns were coded for information exchange (asks for
information about other's priorities and preferences, gives information
about preferences and priorities) and for competitive behaviors (making
positional commitments, using persuasive arguments to bolster one's own
position, using threats, making derogatory remarks; De Dreu, Giebels, &
Van de Vliert, 1998; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). Both categories
were coded reliably by two judges blind to hypotheses and experimental
conditions (.71 < Cohen's ks < .86). To correct for differences between
dyads in the amount of speaking turns per category, we divided the
observed number by the total number of speaking turns (cf. De Dreu et al.,
1998; Weingart et al., 1996).
We also assessed social motivation. Past research suggested that social
motivation (whether the negotiator adopts an egoistic or prosocial goal in
the negotiation) is unrelated to the negotiator's nondirectional motivation
to process information systematically (De Dreu et al., 1999; see Footnote
1), yet it may influence the revision of fixed-pie perceptions (cf. Pruitt,
1990). To verify this possibility in the current research and to be able to
exclude social motivation as a viable alternative for our results, we gave
participants a short questionnaire at the end of the negotiation. The ques-
tionnaire asked how important and valuable other's interests and outcomes
were, to what extent one tried to serve other's interests and outcomes, and
to what extent one was concerned with other's outcomes (all 1 = not at all
to 5 = a great deal). Ratings were averaged in one index (Cronbach's
a = .79).
Joint outcome was calculated by summing the points to the buyer and to
the seller on all four issues. The closer this figure approached 8,000, the
more the negotiators integrated own and other's interests. Ten dyads failed
to reach agreement within the time allotted. Process accountability did not
influence impasse, ^ ( 1 , N = 51) = 1.61, ns. Following the advice of Tripp
and Sondak (1992), we excluded the impasse dyads from further analyses.
Results
Treatment of the data and manipulation check. Data within
dyads were dependent, and negotiator role did not interact with
experimental manipulations on any of the dependent measures.
Hence, data were collapsed over role, and the dyad was used as the
unit of analysis.
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they were
accountable to others for the negotiation process (1 = yes; 2 =
no). All participants answered in line with the manipulation. Table
2 presents the zero-order correlations between the dependent vari-
ables. Social motivation and competitive behavior were negatively
correlated and had the predicted (albeit nonsignificant) relations
with joint outcomes from the negotiation. As expected, informa-
tion exchange was positively correlated with joint outcomes. Al-
though not very strong, fixed-pie perceptions at the end of the
negotiation were negatively related to competitive behavior and
positively related to social motivation. This is consistent with the
idea that social motivation affects the extent to which negotiators
revise their fixed-pie perceptions (Pruitt, 1990). Most important
for current purposes, however, is that the correlations for fixed-pie
perceptions and joint outcomes replicate the pattern observed in
past research. Consistent with L. L. Thompson and Hastie (1990),
fixed-pie perception before negotiation was not correlated with
joint outcomes, whereas fixed-pie perception at the end of the
negotiation was.
Competitive behavior, information exchange, and social moti-
vation. Before we tested our hypotheses, we explored the effects
of process accountability on information exchange, competitive
behavior, and social motivation. Past research suggested that non-
directional motivation and social motivation in negotiation operate
independently, implying that no effects of process accountability
should be found. Indeed, analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with the
indexes of competitive behavior, information exchange, and social
motivation as dependent variables and process accountability
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Table 2
Zero-Order Correlations for All Dependent Variables
1. 2. 4. 5. 6.
1. Social motivation"
2. Competitive behavior
3. Information exchange
4. Fixed-pie perceptions (before)1"
5. Fixed-pie perceptions (after)b
6. Joint outcomes
— - . 35 * 18
13
.01
-.08
.07
—
.17
-.13
.19
.54***
.19
-.20*
.23*
.17
.42***
a
 Social motivation is coded such that higher scores reflect a more prosocial motivation. b Fixed-pie percep-
tions are coded such that lower scores reflect stronger fixed-pie perceptions.
*p<.10. **p<.05. ***p< .01.
as the independent variable revealed no effects, all F(\,
39) < 1.73, ns.
Fixed-pie perception. Hypothesis 1 predicted that process ac-
countability would dilute fixed-pie perceptions and increase the
negotiator's accuracy about the opponent's pay-offs. This hypoth-
esis was tested by submitting the prenegotiation and postnegotia-
tion fixed-pie perception scores to a 2 X 2 (Process Accountabil-
ity X Time of Measurement) ANOVA with process accountability
as the between-dyads factor and time as a repeated measures
factor. Results revealed a main effect for time, F(l, 39) = 8.52,
p < .01, showing that fixed-pie perceptions dissipated over time
and that judgment accuracy increased. This main effect was qual-
ified by an interaction between time and process accountability,
F(l, 39) = 3.79, p < .05. Means are given in Table 3. Consistent
with Hypothesis 1, fixed-pie perceptions were weaker under pro-
cess accountability, but only after negotiation (p < .05) and not
before the negotiation (p > .25).
Joint outcomes. Hypothesis 2 predicted that process account-
ability would lead negotiators to achieve more integrative agree-
ments. Consistent with this prediction, negotiators under process
accountability reached higher joint outcomes (M = 7,060) than
negotiators not held accountable (M = 6,257), F(l, 39) = 9.27,
p < .004.
Fixed-pie perceptions and joint outcomes. Hypothesis 3 pre-
dicted that the effect of process accountability on joint outcomes
would be due to the greater revision of fixed-pie perceptions under
process accountability. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed joint
outcomes as a function of process accountability with the residual
of postnegotiation fixed-pie perceptions as a covariate after pre-
negotiation judgment accuracy had been partialled out. Results
revealed a significant regression, /3 = .35, F(l, 38) = 8.02, p <
Table 3
Fixed-Pie Perceptions Before and After the Negotiation as a
Function of Process Accountability
Process accountability
No
Yes
Fixed-pie
Before negotiation
3,485b
3,672b
perceptions'1
After negotiation
4,204b
7,268C
.007. Although the main effect for process accountability remained
significant, F(l, 38) = 5.58, p < .025, the amount of variance in
joint outcomes explained by process accountability dropped from
R2 = .25 to R2 = .14. The predicted change in beta from simple
to multiple regression (for a discussion, see Kenny, Kashy, &
Bolger, 1998) also was significant, z = 1.67, p < .05 (one-tailed;
we used the updated formula presented at Kenny's website; see
http://nw3.nai.net/~dakenny/mediate.htm). Thus, there is some
evidence to conclude that the reduction in fixed-pie perceptions
under process accountability partially mediates the effect of pro-
cess accountability on joint outcomes (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986).3
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the argument
that nondirectional motivation to engage in systematic processing
of information leads to revisions in fixed-pie perceptions during
negotiation and to more integrative agreements. These results are
consistent with findings by L. L. Thompson (1995) and show that
her findings generalize to actual, face-to-face negotiation. More-
over, results reveal, for the first time, that variation in nondirec-
tional motivation affects not only perceptions but also the quality
of negotiated agreements. We return to these issues in the General
Discussion section.
In the introduction, we distinguished between social motivation
(prosocial vs. individualistic motivation) that influences the
amount of information negotiators exchange and nondirectional
motivation that influences the extent to which negotiators system-
atically process this information. Past research by De Dreu et al.
(1999) revealed that individual differences in social motiva-
tion (i.e., social value orientations) are not related to individual
differences in nondirectional motivation (i.e., need for cogni-
tive closure). Experiment 1 yielded similar results. Process
accountability did not influence social motivation, competitive
behavior, and information exchange, but it did influence the ne-
gotiator's tendency to hold on to his or her fixed-pie perceptions.
Thus, we have mounting evidence to conclude that in negotiation,
social and nondirectional motivations are unrelated and operate
independently.
a
 Fixed-pie perceptions range between 0 and 12,000; higher scores indicate
greater judgment accuracy. b>c Means in the same column with different
superscripts differ at p < .05.
3
 An alternative procedure is to enter the difference between post- and
prenegotiation fixed-pie perceptions as a covariate. This alternative proce-
dure is less than optimal because of the problems associated with differ-
ence scores (Stevens, 1992). Nevertheless, its results yield identical con-
clusions.
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The reader might argue that our manipulation of process ac-
countability not only increased participants' motivation to process
information in a systematic way but also increased their desire to
make a good impression and, accordingly, to reach good outcomes
(cf. outcome accountability; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). If true,
participants under process accountability would have had higher
aspirations than participants in the control condition, consequently
would have been more resistant to concession making, and might
have worked harder to find integrative solutions that satisfied both
their own and the other's high aspirations. Research by Ben-Yoav
and Pruitt (1984) and Carnevale, Pruitt, and Britton (1979), for
instance, has shown that negotiators who feel accountable to their
constituents have higher aspirations and make fewer concessions
than negotiators not held accountable by their constituents. In other
words, the question is whether our manipulation of process ac-
countability truly focused participants on the process rather than
on the outcome of the negotiation. We believe it did because if
participants had been focused on process and outcomes, a different
pattern of results would have been obtained. That is, if participants
in the process accountability condition had had higher aspirations
and stronger desire to make good impressions, this should have
influenced levels of competitive behavior, information exchange,
and social motivation. Because our manipulation of accountability
did not affect competitive behavior, information exchange, or
social motivation, we feel comfortable concluding that we manip-
ulated process accountability instead of outcome accountability.
By implication, we believe that the results in Experiment 1 cannot
be (fully) explained in terms of different aspiration levels between
the control and the experimental condition.
Experiment 2
From a theoretical point of view, we had no reason to expect that
process accountability would influence the amount of information
exchanged during negotiation, only that it would influence the
extent to which negotiators processed the information that became
available during negotiation. Although the results of Experiment 1
were consistent with this reasoning (i.e., process accountability
had no effects on the amount of information exchanged), we
cannot exclude the possibility that our measure of information
exchange was not sensitive enough to detect real differences. To
deal with this issue, we used a design that held the amount of
information about preferences and priorities constant across dif-
ferent levels of process accountability in Experiment 2. Doing so
allowed us to unequivocally ascribe effects of process account-
ability to information processing rather than information exchange.
Assuming the amount of information exchanged is not respon-
sible for changes in fixed-pie perceptions, two possible explana-
tions for the effects observed in Experiment 1 seem feasible. The
first is that process accountability influenced the extent to which
negotiators encoded the information exchanged during negotiation.
Under process accountability, negotiators attend more to the in-
formation that is exchanged, incorporate this new information into
their understanding of the negotiation task, and develop more
accurate understanding of their opponent's pay-off structure. This
encoding explanation follows Tetlock's (1992) analysis of the
effects of (process) accountability: To preempt criticism, decision
makers carefully consider and encode all relevant information
provided to them.
Research by E. P. Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, and
Bargh (1994) suggests another possibility. Their study concerned
the influence of covert priming on person perception and examined
the extent to which people were able to accurately recode infor-
mation about the target person. In their experiments, some partic-
ipants were placed under process accountability prior to reading
person information, and other participants were placed under pro-
cess accountability after they had read the person information.
Results showed that predecisional accountability reduced the in-
fluence of the covert prime and, consequently, that participants
formed more evenhanded evaluations of the target person. Inter-
estingly, however, postdecisional accountability had similar ef-
fects—it reduced the influence of the covert prime and led to more
evenhanded evaluations. Thus, people are able to construe a pos-
teriori information they have previously encoded (see also
Sedikides, 1990), and process accountability enhances such
recoding.
In Experiment 1, negotiators under process accountability ex-
pected to be interviewed about the reasons underlying their deci-
sions and, therefore, may have been motivated to recode informa-
tion about the task as well as possible to be prepared for the
interview. Thus, revisions of fixed-pie perceptions under process
accountability may have been due to (a) better encoding of infor-
mation during negotiation, (b) better recoding of the exchanged
information after the negotiation had been completed, or (c) better
encoding as well as recoding.
To examine these explanations empirically, we gave participants
in Experiment 2 the same instructions as in Experiment 1: They
learned that they would negotiate the transaction of a used car,
which required an agreement on four issues. While reading the
instructions, participants received information about their own
pay-offs only and filled out the measure of fixed-pie perceptions.
Subsequently, participants received full information about their
opposing negotiator's pay-offs and, after a brief filler task, were
asked to complete the measure of fixed-pie perceptions once again.
Because participants had received full information about the oth-
er's pay-offs, we expected a revision of fixed-pie perceptions
between the first and the second measure. To examine whether
process accountability enhanced encoding, recoding, or both, we
manipulated process accountability (as in Experiment 1) either
prior to or after participants had received full information about
their opponent's pay-offs. If increased encoding were responsible
for the greater judgment accuracy, process accountability should
have resulted in fewer fixed-pie perceptions only when manipu-
lated before full information was provided. If improved encoding
were not effective, process accountability should have resulted in
fewer fixed-pie perceptions regardless of whether it was manipu-
lated before or after full information was provided. Finally, to
examine whether recoding alone could be responsible for the
revision of fixed-pie perceptions, we told participants right before
they completed the second measure of fixed-pie perceptions that
they had or had not been selected for the interview. If recoding
were responsible for the revision of fixed-pie perceptions, process
accountability should have resulted in fewer fixed-pie perceptions
only when participants still anticipated the interview. If recoding
were not responsible, process accountability should have resulted
in fewer fixed-pie perceptions regardless of whether participants
still anticipated the interview or not.
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Method
Design and participants. The design had five conditions. In all con-
ditions, participants (a) received the standard instructions, (b) completed
the fixed-pie perception measure before they received any information
about their opponent's pay-offs, (c) received full information about their
opponent's pay-offs, (d) completed a 10-min filler-task, (e) completed the
fixed-pie perception measure once again, and (f) answered manipulation
checks and were debriefed. In the preinformation accountability/interview
anticipated condition, process accountability was manipulated before full
information was provided, and, right before the second fixed-pie percep-
tion measure, participants were told that they had been selected for the
interview. In the preinformation accountability/no interview anticipated
condition, process accountability was manipulated before full information
was provided, and, right before the second fixed-pie perception measure,
participants were told that they had not been selected for the interview. In
the postinformation accountability/interview anticipated condition, process
accountability was manipulated after full information was provided, and,
right before the second fixed-pie perception measure, participants were told
that they had been selected for the interview. In the postinformation
accountability/no interview anticipated condition, process accountability
was manipulated after full information was provided, and, right before the
second fixed-pie perception measure, participants were told that they had
not been selected for the interview. To obtain a baseline, we included a
fifth condition, in which process accountability manipulations were
omitted.
One-hundred twenty-five male and female undergraduate students at the
University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment, for which they
received a one-hour credit to fulfill a course requirement or 10 Dutch
guilders (approximately U.S. $5). Participants were randomly allocated to
experimental conditions. Participant sex and participation inducements
(course credit or payment) had no effects and are not discussed further.
Procedure and experimental tasks. The procedure was similar to the
one used in the first experiment. Because, in Experiment 1, no effects for
role were observed, all participants received the buyer role. Participants
came in even numbers to the laboratory where they received an information
package containing negotiation materials (role instructions, background
information, and their own profit schedule) and information intended to
manipulate process accountability. These materials were the same as used
in Experiment 1. In the control condition, participants read through the
instructions and completed the fixed-pie perception measure (see Experi-
ment 1). Subsequently, the experimenter collected the materials and gave
participants a second booklet that contained their opponent's issue chart
(see Table 1) and a 10-min filler task that was neither empirically nor
theoretically related to the current experiment. After the filler task, the
experimenter collected the instructions, and gave the participants a third
booklet. Participants once again were asked to complete the fixed-pie
perception measure, then answered some manipulation checks (see below)
and some questions about their social motivation in the upcoming negoti-
ation. On completion, participants were told that the study was over and
that there would be no real negotiation. Participants were fully debriefed
and compensated for participation.
In the other conditions, the exact same procedure was followed with the
following unique alterations (see also Figure 1). In the preinformation
accountability/interview anticipated condition, participants received the
manipulation of process accountability (see Experiment 1) before they
started to read the instructions (i.e., in the first booklet). In addition,
together with the third booklet, they received a note from the experimenter
indicating that their participant number had been randomly selected for the
interview and that immediately after the experiment, a date would be set for
the interview. In the preinformation accountability/no interview anticipated
condition, participants received the manipulation of process accountability
before they started to read the instructions. In addition, together with the
third booklet, they received a note from the experimenter indicating that
from a random selection, their participant number had not been selected for
the interview and that after the experiment, no further actions would be
taken. In the postinformation accountability/interview anticipated condi-
tion, participants received the manipulation of process accountability im-
mediately after they had received full information about their opposing
negotiator's pay-offs (i.e., in the second booklet). In addition, together with
the third booklet, they received a note from the experimenter indicating that
their participant number had been randomly selected for the interview and
that immediately after the experiment, a date would be set for the inter-
view. In the postinformation accountability/no interview anticipated con-
dition, participants received the manipulation of process accountability
immediately after they had received full information about their opposing
negotiator's pay-offs (i.e., in the second booklet). In addition, together with
the third booklet, they received a note from the experimenter indicating that
from a random selection, their participant number had not been selected for
the interview and that after the experiment, no further actions would be
taken.
Dependent measures. Fixed-pie perceptions were measured twice (in
the first booklet before the receipt of full information and afterwards, in the
third booklet) using the same methods and procedures used in Experi-
ment 1. Four participants appeared to have made wild guesses and had
scores that deviated extremely from the mean. The scores from these
participants were replaced by a score that was two standard deviations from
the overall mean (as in Experiment 1, excluding these participants did not
affect the results, however). To check the adequacy of the manipulation of
process accountability, we asked participants at the end of the third booklet
whether they (a) had to account for their decisions during negotiation in an
Task and role
instructions
r
Pre-test
Measure of
Fixed-Pie
Information
on Other's
Payoffs
M
10-minute filler task
Post-test
Measure of
Fixed-Pie
Manipulation
checks and
debriefing
Accountability manipu-
lation in the pre-
information conditions
Accountability manipu-
lation in the post-
information conditions
(not) selected for the
interview in the (no)
interview anticipated
conditions
Figure 1. Overview of (the timing and ordering of) experimental manipulations in Experiment 2.
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interview, (b) had, while answering questions, taken into account that they
might be interviewed about why they gave certain answers, and (c) would,
during the upcoming negotiation, be motivated to make thorough and
well-conceived decisions. Questions could be answered on 5-point scales
ranging from (1) certainly to (5) not at all. Ratings were averaged into one
index (Cronbach's a = .67). As in Experiment 1, we finally asked
participants about their social motivation in the upcoming negotiation to
check whether process accountability would influence an egoistic or proso-
cial motivation. The questions were the same as used in Experiment 1, and
ratings were averaged into one index (Cronbach's a = .83).
Results
Manipulation check. A one-way ANOVA with condition as
the between-participants variable and the ratings on the manipu-
lation check as dependent variable yielded a significant main effect
for condition, F(4, 120) = 3.53, p < .01. Tukey tests (/? < .05)
revealed that the preinformation accountability/interview antici-
pated condition (Af = 3.31) and the postinformation accountabil-
ity/interview anticipated condition (Af = 3.46) did not differ from
each other, whereas both differed significantly from the pre-
information accountability/no interview anticipated condition
(Af = 2.92), the postinformation accountability/no interview an-
ticipated condition (Af = 2.93), and the control condition
(Af = 2.77). The latter three conditions did not differ from one
another. Thus, participants felt more accountable and were more
motivated to process information systematically when process
accountability was manipulated and participants had been selected
for the interview.
Social motivation. Before we analyzed the results for fixed-pie
perceptions, we explored effects of process accountability manip-
ulations on social motivation. Consistent with Experiment 1, ex-
perimental condition had no effect on the participant's tendency to
adopt a prosocial motivation, F(4, 120) < 1, ns. This result
converges with earlier findings suggesting that social and nondi-
rectional motivations in negotiation operate independently.
Fixed-pie perceptions. To examine whether encoding or re-
coding was responsible for the revision of fixed-pie perceptions
under process accountability, we submitted the preinformation and
postinformation fixed-pie perceptions to a 5 X 2 (Condition X
Time of Measurement) ANOVA with the time as a repeated
measures factor and condition as a between-participants factor.
Results revealed a main effect for time, F(l, 120) = 111.84, p <
.001, showing weaker fixed-pie perceptions at the second measure.
The main effect for time was qualified by an interaction between
time and condition, F(4, 120) = 2.54, p < .05. Cell means are
given in Table 4. Follow-up analyses revealed no effect for con-
dition on the preinformation fixed-pie perceptions, F(4,
120) = 1.50, p > .20, but a significant effect for condition on the
postinformation fixed-pie perceptions, F(4, 120) = 2.49, p < .05.
Tukey tests (p < .05) revealed that the preinformation account-
ability/interview anticipated condition resulted in weaker fixed-pie
perceptions and greater judgment accuracy (Af = 8,054) than the
postinformation accountability/interview anticipated condition
(M = 4,367), the postinformation accountability/no interview an-
ticipated condition (Af = 4,524), and the control condition
(Af = 4,971). The preinformation accountability/no interview an-
ticipated condition (Af = 6,584) took an intermediate position that
differed nonsignificantly, but marginally (p < .10), from any of
the other conditions. This pattern of results indicates increased
Table 4
Fixed-Pie Perceptions Before and After Information About
Other's Pay-offs Is Given, Broken Down
for Experimental Conditions
Condition
Preinformation accountability/
interview anticipated
Preinformation accountability/
no interview anticipated
Postinformation accountability/
interview anticipated
Postinformation accountability/
no interview anticipated
Control
Fixed-pie perceptions8
Before
information
1,704"
471"
528"
1,834"
1,044"
After
information
8,054"
6,584bc
4,367C
4,524C
4,97 lc
a
 Fixed-pie perceptions range between 0 and 12,000; higher scores indicate
greater judgment accuracy.
"
c
 Means in the same column with different superscripts differ at/? < .05.
encoding of information to be the primary factor underlying the
revision of fixed-pie perceptions in the case of process account-
ability. Recoding appears not to contribute in itself but tends to
strengthen the effect of encoding.
Discussion
Results of Experiment 2 were consistent with those obtained in
Experiment 1 in several ways. As in Experiment 1, we did not find
effects of experimental manipulations of process accountability on
measures of social motivation, once again suggesting that nondi-
rectional and social motivations are unrelated (cf. De Dreu et al.,
1999). Second and more important, compared with the control
condition, fixed-pie perceptions were weaker when process ac-
countability was manipulated prior to information. This finding is
important because, contrary to Experiment 1, we held constant the
amount of information participants received about their opponent's
pay-offs. This means that we can conclude that process account-
ability influences fixed-pie perceptions through increased process-
ing of information rather than through increased information
exchange.
A second goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether effects
of process accountability on revisions in fixed-pie perception are
due to increased encoding of information, to increased recoding, or
both. By manipulating the timing of the manipulation of process
accountability (before or after information about other's pay-offs
was given), as well as by telling participants prior to the second
measure of fixed-pie perceptions whether or not they would indeed
be interviewed, we were able to distinguish between encoding and
recoding effects. Results showed weaker fixed-pie perceptions
when process accountability was induced before rather than after
participants received information about other's pay-offs, providing
evidence for encoding rather than recoding. This effect was par-
ticularly strong when participants learned prior to the second
measure of fixed-pie perceptions that they had been selected for
the interview and was somewhat weaker when they learned that
they had not been selected for the interview. This effect may
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suggest that recoding is at work as well, but only when thorough
encoding precedes it.
General Discussion
Fixed-pie perceptions constitute a pervasive barrier to integra-
tive negotiation. In the current research, a majority of the negoti-
ators entered the negotiation with fixed-pie perceptions, and those
who remained committed to them achieved less integrative agree-
ments.4 As such, the current study corroborates past research
showing that perceptual inaccuracies in negotiation may seriously
limit negotiator success (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; L. L. Thomp-
son & Hastie, 1990). More importantly, however, the current
research contributes to an understanding of the motivational fac-
tors underlying a negotiator's tendency to revise his or her fixed-
pie perceptions. Experiment 1 suggested that nondirectional mo-
tivation to engage in thorough, systematic processing of
information released fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation, re-
sulting in more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 clarified that
this revision of fixed-pie perceptions under process accountability
was due to better encoding of the information. Our results have
implications for thinking about motivation in negotiation, as well
as for dual-process models about human information processing.
Below, we consider these implications in some detail.
Cognition and Motivation in Negotiation
To understand why negotiators fail to reach integrative agree-
ments, research and theory have traditionally focused on motiva-
tional factors or on cognitive biases and heuristics (Kramer &
Messick, 1995). In fact, even quite recent reviews of the negotia-
tion literature have been able to discuss these two streams of
research in isolation from one another (see, e.g., Carnevale &
Pruitt, 1992; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). However, the walls be-
tween the motivational and cognitive approaches to negotiation
have begun to break down (see, e.g., Carnevale & Probst, 1998; De
Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu et al., 1999; Gelfand & Christako-
poulou, 1999; O'Connor, 1997; L. L. Thompson, 1995). The bulk
of this new research has considered how social motivation influ-
ences cognitive processes in negotiation, that is, it has examined
how negotiators with prosocial as opposed to individualistic mo-
tivation perceive the negotiation task, including their opponent's
pay-off structure. The results of these studies have shown that
social motivation in negotiation influences the amount of informa-
tion about preferences and priorities negotiators exchange, leading
them toward particular conclusions consistent with their motiva-
tional goals.
The current research complements this line of inquiry by focus-
ing on nondirectional motivation. On the basis of dual-process
models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, in press), we
hypothesized that process accountability would motivate negotia-
tors to engage in thorough, systematic processing of information,
leading them to discover their fixed-pie perceptions to be errone-
ous. This in turn was expected to result in more accurate percep-
tions of their opponent's pay-offs and, ultimately, in more inte-
grative agreements. Some initial evidence was provided by L. L.
Thompson (1995) who had participants observe a videotaped
negotiation between their representative and his or her opponent.
Consistent with current findings, L. L. Thompson's results showed
that participants had fixed-pie perceptions but less so when they
were under process accountability. Experiment 1 replicated this
finding when participants engaged in a face-to-face negotiation in
which they were able to say and do whatever they deemed neces-
sary and appropriate. This change in setting is important in that it
increases the ecological validity of the negotiation context because
the interaction is natural and in a context that is familiar and
motivating to participants (cf. Morris, Larrick & Su, 1999). In
addition, the current research allowed us to go beyond perceptions
and instead examine the interplay between motivation, (revisions
of) fixed-pie perceptions, behavioral interaction, and resultant out-
comes. Finally, the current research enabled us to uncover why
process accountability produced revisions in fixed-pie perceptions.
That is, Experiment 2 revealed that process accountability has its
effects through increased encoding (and to some extent, recoding)
of information, rather than through increased exchange of infor-
mation. All in all, these results allow us to conclude that fixed-pie
perceptions are a pervasive barrier to integrative negotiation only
to the extent that negotiators lack motivation to engage in thor-
ough, systematic encoding of the information exchanged during
negotiation.
The conclusion that fixed-pie perceptions hinder integrative
negotiation only in case of low nondirectional motivation implies
that past research finding strong negative correlations between
fixed-pie perceptions and integrative agreements primarily in-
volved participants with low nondirectional motivation. Such
would be consistent with the general notion in social and cognitive
psychology that individuals do not engage in systematic, thorough
processing of information unless they are explicitly motivated to
do so (cf. Chaiken & Trope, 1999). It cannot be excluded, how-
ever, that studies finding a negative correlation between fixed-pie
perceptions and integrative agreements implicitly or explicitly
provided participants with individualistic or competitive motiva-
tion, thereby reducing information exchange during negotiation. In
such cases, nondirectional motivation to engage in systematic
processing of information may have had little effect on fixed-pie
perceptions, simply because there was little information to be
processed. In fact, this conclusion would be consistent with re-
search showing that negotiators with an individualistic motivation
hold on to their fixed-pie perceptions (see, e.g., Carnevale & Isen,
1986; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Pruitt, 1990). In addition,
much of the past research on fixed-pie perceptions used MBA
students, who have been shown to be relatively competitive in their
orientation toward negotiation (cf. De Dreu & McCusker, 1997).
Recently, De Dreu et al. (2000) proposed a motivated
information-processing model of negotiation. It argues that indi-
viduals have or adopt an egoistic or prosocial motive that drives
the information they provide, attend to, assimilate, and dismiss.
Those with an egoistic motive convey contentious, persuasive
arguments intended to bolster their own point of view and to
dismiss the interests of their opposing negotiator. In contrast,
4
 We counted the number of participants with a perfect fixed-pie per-
ception at the beginning of the negotiation. In Experiment 1, 52.8% had a
perfect fixed-pie perception, and in Experiment 2, 65.2% started with a
perfect fixed-pie perception. Note that this measure is conservative in that
it does not allow for any mistakes in participant's assessments. Most likely,
actual percentages were higher.
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individuals with a prosocial motive tend to convey insights into
other's interests and to seek and provide information about each
other's preferences and priorities. The current research qualifies
and expands this motivated information-processing model of ne-
gotiation in two ways. First, it distinguishes social motivation from
nondirectional motivation and provides evidence that these two
motivations operate independently in the context of negotiation.
That is, the analyses revealed no effects of process accountability
on postnegotiation measures of social motivation, or on competi-
tive behavior or information exchange during negotiation. This is
consistent with other findings that no relationship exists between
individual differences in social value orientation (social motiva-
tion) and individual differences in need for cognitive closure (cf.
nondirectional motivation; De Dreu et al., 1999). These findings
are interesting because they suggest a more fine-grained analysis
of the effects of motivation on negotiator cognition, behavior, and
outcomes.
Second, the model proposed by De Dreu et al. (2000) does not
specify how nondirectional and social motivation jointly predict
integrative negotiation. With regard to the revision of fixed-pie
perceptions, current results offer some clues. Past research re-
vealed some support for the idea that social motivation leads to
revisions in fixed-pie perceptions because social motivation influ-
ences information exchange during negotiation (Carnevale & Isen,
1986; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; but see Kimmel et al.,
1980; O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Our study shows that non-
directional motivation leads to revisions in fixed-pie perceptions
because nondirectional motivation influences the encoding of in-
formation that is exchanged during negotiation. This suggests that
social motivation influences negotiator perception because it in-
fluences the amount of information that is exchanged during
negotiation whereas nondirectional motivation influences the
depth of information processing. Thus, at least with respect to
fixed-pie perceptions, social and nondirectional motivations tend
to lead to the same outcome but by different routes (i.e., greater
information exchange vs. better encoding of the information that is
exchanged).
Fixed-pie perceptions are but one of the many (cognitive) bar-
riers to integrative negotiation (for a recent review, see Bazerman,
Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000), and the motivated information-
processing model of negotiation suggests how these barriers may
be leveled. To test the generality of the currently proposed frame-
work, future research could examine the joint influence of social
and nondirectional motivations on the extent to which (cognitive)
barriers such as gain-loss framing, overconfidence, and anchoring-
and-adjustment affect integrative negotiation. We expect these
barriers to be far less influential when negotiators (a) have a
prosocial rather than individualistic motivation and (b) have high
rather than low nondirectional motivation to engage in thorough,
systematic processing of information.
Dual-Process Models
The motivated information-processing model of negotiation dis-
cussed above builds on dual-process models developed to under-
stand how individuals solve logical problems, consider persuasive
arguments, or form impressions about others (Chaiken & Trope,
1999; Smith & DeCoster, in press). The current research success-
fully applied key notions from these models about the influence of
nondirectional motivation and showed its predictive validity in
situations of mixed-motive conflict where individuals interact and
need to coordinate their activities. We believe this is a valuable
extension because past research supporting dual-process models
confined itself to situations in which (non)social stimuli were
presented to individuals who were not interacting (see also Lerner
& Tetlock, 1999). Past and current evidence together suggest that
dual-process models accurately describe and explain psychological
phenomena ranging from memory systems (Smith & DeCoster, in
press), by way of individual judgment and decision making
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), to interpersonal
behavior and outcomes in mixed-motive conflict.
Although research evidence is overwhelmingly consistent with
contemporary conceptions of the human memory system (McClel-
land, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; Smith & DeCoster, in
press), the parsimony of dual-process models has recently been
challenged (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The key point is that
one may conceive of two qualitatively different modes for pro-
cessing information, as is assumed in the dual-process models, or
instead take a more quantitative perspective assuming that people
differ only in the extent to which they process information in a
systematic way. The latter position is consistent with Kruglanski's
lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster,
1996), which states that individuals differ in their desire for cog-
nitive closure. Those with high need for cognitive closure tend to
jump to conclusions on the basis of incomplete evidence and to
rely on simplified rules of thumb to make judgments and decisions.
Those with low need for cognitive closure tend to postpone con-
clusions until all relevant evidence is processed and incorporated
in their understanding of the situation. Need for cognitive closure
reduces the tendency to engage in systematic processing of infor-
mation, and both personality and situational influences contribute
to the individual's need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Web-
ster, 1996). The present study was designed to understand the role
of nondirectional motivation in negotiation and was not designed
to discriminate between dual-process models and lay epistemic
theory. More research is needed to examine whether nondirec-
tional motivation in negotiation produces qualitatively different
ways of information processing or whether it produces differences
in the extent to which people engage in systematic processing of
information.
Research in the realm of dual-process models suggests that
under particular circumstances, nonsystematic, heuristic process-
ing of information may actually be more beneficial than system-
atic, deliberate information processing (for a review, see Chaiken
& Trope, 1999). This seems to run counter to the basic message
contained in the current data, namely, that higher levels of nondi-
rectional motivation increase the quality of negotiated agreements
through better encoding of information and concomitant revisions
of fixed-pie perceptions. It is important to realize that the current
studies were conducted in a setting where fixed-pie perceptions
were truly inaccurate. Although situations with integrative poten-
tial are very likely (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982), some negotiations
are truly distributive and one party's outcomes are indeed diamet-
rically opposed to the opposing negotiator's outcomes. In such
situations, fixed-pie perceptions are accurate, and it may be that
nonsystematic, heuristic processing of information results in more
efficient and less effortful negotiation processes than systematic,
deliberate information processing yielding nothing but confirma-
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tion of one's original fixed-pie perceptions. Future research is
needed to examine whether and when heuristic information pro-
cessing leads to negotiation processes and outcomes superior to
those of systematic, deliberate information processing.
Conclusion
The present research shows that negotiators under process ac-
countability engage in better encoding of information exchanged
during negotiation, which releases their fixed-pie perceptions and
enables them to reach mutually beneficial, integrative agreements.
These findings increase the understanding of the motivational
factors underlying an important and pervasive barrier to integra-
tive negotiation, provide a building block in a more general mo-
tivated information-processing model of negotiation, and extend
dual-process models to the important interpersonal domain of
mixed-motive conflict. Although prosocial versus egoistic goals
determine the amount of information negotiators exchange, non-
directional motivation elicited by process accountability deter-
mines the extent to which opposing negotiators engage in thor-
ough, systematic processing of information. Thus, increasing
nondirectional motivation may help negotiators to discover new
integrative potential and thereby create more beneficial agree-
ments for all parties involved.
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